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Abstract 
This article investigates how the location behavior of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) 
is shaped by the economic institutions of the host countries. The analysis covers a wide 
set of geographically proximate economies with different degrees of integration with the 
‘Old’ 15 European Union (EU) members: New Member States, Accession and Candidate 
Countries, as well as European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) countries and the Russian 
Federation. The article aims to shed new light on the heterogeneity of MNE preferences 
for the host countries’ regulatory settings (including labor market and business 
regulation), legal aspects (i.e. protection of property rights and contract enforcement) and 
the weight of the government in the economy. By employing data on 6,888 greenfield 
investment projects, the random-coefficient Mixed Logit analysis shows that, while the 
quality of the national institutional framework is generally beneficial for the attraction of 
foreign investment, MNEs preferences over economic institutions are highly 
heterogeneous across sectors and business functions.  
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Over the past two decades the European Union (EU) has strongly intensified economic 
and political relationships with its geographically neighboring countries. Two rounds of 
enlargement in 2004 and 2007 brought several ex-socialist economies under the aegis of 
the EU, Croatia joined in 2013, and more countries are currently candidate to 
membership. In addition, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was launched in 
2004, with the aim of creating a ring of countries across the Mediterranean and the East 
of Europe with which the EU could intensify economic linkages as well as develop 
peaceful and cooperative relationships (COM 2004). The complex set of connections that 
the EU has established with a wide range of actors in the area has gradually enhanced the 
economic and institutional integration between the EU itself and its counterparts. While 
full economic integration was attained with the New Member States (NMS), the 
interactions with candidate countries and ENP countries are still growing.  
 
In this scenario, Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) from the Old EU-15 members have 
had wide and increasing opportunities to expand their operations within the continent and 
beyond its immediate borders. The aim of this article is to study the location of 
investments undertaken by EU-15 MNEs towards a wide set of locations integrated or 
linked to different extents to the Union: NMS, Accession and Candidate Countries as 
well as ENP countries and the Russian Federation.
1
 This is a highly heterogeneous group 
of EU members, transition and developing economies, the latter two groups having in 
common their geographic proximity to the EU. This entails a set of privileged 
                                                 
1
 The countries here considered are 21, namely: (a) NMS: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia; (b) Accession and candidate countries: 
Albania, Croatia (which joined the EU in July 2013) and Turkey; (c) ENP: Ukraine; Algeria, Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia; (d) Russian Federation. 
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relationships with the Union, ranging from full membership in the case of NMS, 
accession treaties, action plans within the ENP framework, and bilateral agreements in 
the case of Russia. 
 
In particular the article aims to analyze the role of economic institutions in shaping MNE 
greenfield investment location decisions once new opportunities and geographic options 
are made available by tighter economic integration or more favorable preconditions for 
foreign investment as a result of formal agreements. By exploiting the unique conditions 
offered by the selected group of countries with varying degrees of economic integration 
with the EU and highly heterogeneous institutional conditions, the article focuses on three 
key dimensions of the recipient economies: (i) regulatory characteristics connected to 
both national labor markets and business conditions; (ii) legal aspects relevant in market 
transactions, i.e. property rights protection and degree of contract enforcement; (iii) 
weight of government intervention in the host countries’ economies.  
 
The contribution of the article is threefold. First, it innovatively combines the literature 
on institutional conditions with the analysis of MNEs location strategies by focusing, 
differently from other existing works, on economic institutions and their different 
dimensions. In fact, although the institutional environment of recipient countries has been 
the object of analysis of a number of studies, the great majority of this literature focuses 
on political, rather than economic, features of the national institutional setting.  Second, 
the high heterogeneity of MNE behavior with reference to economic institutions takes 
central stage in the article, therefore making use in the empirical strategy of random-
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coefficient Mixed Logit (MXL) models (still rarely employed in this field of research)
2
 in 
order to fully capture this heterogeneity and its drivers. The investigation of the diversity 
of MNE preferences is still an underdeveloped area of enquiry, especially as far as 
quantitative analyses are concerned, while qualitative approaches have already started to 
explore such a dimension (e.g., Phelps and Wu 2009). Hence, this work contributes to the 
ongoing scholarly debate by empirically testing the nature and magnitude of MNE 
preferences with respect to recipient countries’ institutions. In so doing, the article also 
explores how heterogeneous preferences in MNE localization strategies vary across 
different sectors of economic activity and business functions. Third, notwithstanding the 
increasing geo-political and economic importance of the EU ‘neighborhood’, there is 
very limited empirical evidence on the position of this set of countries in global 
investment networks. Filling this gap is crucially important for the design of appropriate 
development policies by the European Union, as well as for national governments and a 
number of international organizations active in the area (e.g., United Nation Development 
Programme and the World Bank among others). The effectiveness of industrial and 
development policies increasingly depends on the extent to which interactions and 
governance within GVCs are taken into account in the design of innovative strategies and 
policy tools: countries and regions participate differently into GVCs, with relevant 
implications for the support of local capacity upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002; 
Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005). 
 
                                                 
2
 See Defever (2006; 2012) and Cheng (2008) for previous modelling of MNEs location choices with 
random-coefficient Mixed Logit.  
5 
 
 
The analysis is based on the combination of data on 6,888 greenfield investment projects 
undertaken between 2003 and 2008 by MNEs from EU-15 countries into a set of 21 
destination countries, and Fraser Institute data on their economic institutional conditions. 
The article firstly applies a standard Conditional Logit model in order to maximize 
comparability with existing studies and, in a subsequent step, explores MNEs’ behavioral 
heterogeneity by means of random-coefficient Mixed Logit. Although we should refrain 
from any causal interpretation of the results, the empirical analysis suggests that 
economic institutions are strongly associated to greenfield investment location decisions 
after controlling for other economic characteristics of the host economies, showing 
significant heterogeneity in MNEs’ preferences over different institutional settings both 
by sector and function of the investment. 
 
The article is structured as follows: the next section provides an overview of the relevant 
literature on MNE location behavior and on the role of economic institutions in attracting 
foreign investors, identifying the main research questions and hypotheses to be tested. 
Data and variables used in the analysis are presented, providing some descriptive 
evidence about the location of European foreign investment in the group of countries of 
interest and their institutional conditions. The methodology is then discussed, followed by 
the presentation of the empirical results. Finally, some concluding remarks and tentative 
policy implications are drawn in the final section of the article.   
 
MNEs location strategies: Host economy advantages and institutional conditions 
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The analytical framework for the study of MNE location decisions is Dunning (1977, 
1988)’s Ownership-Location-Internalization (OLI) eclectic paradigm. The OLI 
framework implies that the existence of ownership-specific advantages (O) possessed by 
some firms may lead to the decision to internalize (I) activities and to undertake 
operations in sites endowed with location-specific advantages (L). Consequently, the 
combination of (O), (L) and (I) advantages justifies MNEs’ existence and their ability to 
maximize their productive efficiency while minimizing the impact of uncertain and 
imperfect markets on their operations.  
 
However, whilst the interactions between ownership and internalization advantages have 
been extensively investigated (see, for example, the seminal work by Buckley and Casson 
1976; Rugman 1981), the study of location advantages has suffered from a number of 
conceptual and empirical constraints, namely a problematic conceptualization of space 
and the severe restriction in data availability (McCann and Mudambi 2005; Iammarino 
and McCann 2013). 
 
In the traditional empirical economics literature attention has been directed to factor 
endowments in a broad sense, including, among other location drivers, physical 
infrastructure (e.g., Coughlin, Terza, and Arromdee 1991), policy instruments (Basile, 
Castellani, and Zanfei 2008), and labour costs (e.g., Liu, Lovely, and Ondrich 2010). 
Urban and regional economics contributions have focused on agglomeration economies, 
spatially bounded externalities and the geographic concentration of economic activity as 
drivers of MNEs’ location behaviour (e.g. Head, Ries, and Swenson 1995; Guimarães, 
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Figueiredo, and Woodward 2000;). Furthermore, empirical studies within the New 
Economic Geography have shown that not only MNEs tend to replicate the location 
decisions of previous firms with similar attributes, but agglomeration effects also act 
through demand linkages (Head and Mayer 2004) as well as specialized inputs supply 
(LaFountain 2005).  
 
The Economic Geography literature has more recently focused on the fragmentation of 
international activities of MNEs along functional lines. This stream of research has 
highlighted that MNE location behavior and the fragmentation of production processes 
into different functions respond to spatial concentration mechanisms (Defever 2006, 
2012). The concept of Global Value Chains (GVC) has been more recently added to this 
debate with the analysis of the linkages between MNEs location behavior along value 
chains (Saliola and Zanfei 2009; Crescenzi, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti 2014). These 
analyses suggest that the location of different MNE functions/value chain stages is 
influenced by different corporate strategies depending on the characteristics of the 
investor and the specific operation offshored. Such a segmentation of the production 
process at multiple spatial scales involves both intra- and inter-firm relationships and, at 
the same time, it entails that each stage of the production chain is embedded into local 
networks of actors and institutions (Coe, Dicken, and Hess 2008). In this respect, this 
article analyses the location of different business functions along the production chain, 
but only considering the intra-firm component of the network given the nature of our data 
(i.e. individual greenfield FDI). Interestingly, extant quantitative research on the intra-
firm organization of activities at different value chain stages is still in its infancy (Yeung 
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and Coe 2015). Indeed, research on MNE location behavior has recently focused on the 
phase of firms’ life cycle, highlighting a co-evolution of location decisions and 
accumulation of firms’ capabilities (Stam 2007), and the effect of spatial heterogeneity on 
MNE entry modes through the interaction between the strength of local externalities and 
firms’ competencies (Mariotti, Piscitello, and Elia 2014). 
 
Systems of innovation conditions and their relationship with MNEs strategies have been 
increasingly in the focus of the literature at the intersection between Economic 
Geography and International Business (Beugelsdijk and Mudambi 2013; Iammarino and 
McCann 2013). The international spatial allocation of MNE activities tends to be marked 
by the existence of ‘core and periphery’ patterns according to the complexity of activities 
(McCann and Mudambi 2005), leading to differences in territorial trajectories and growth 
dynamics and to cumulative causation mechanisms (e.g., Cantwell and Iammarino 1998, 
2001). Since technological development tends to be cumulative in nature and 
characterized by elements that are bounded in specific places, it is suggested that MNEs 
establish networks for innovation across locations by tapping into regional profiles of 
specialization and strengthening local technological competencies, thus feeding a 
regional hierarchy of centers across and within national boundaries (Cantwell and 
Iammarino 2003). The interactions between regional knowledge bases and MNEs 
technological strategies are investigated in terms of knowledge spillovers and 
externalities, particularly in the European (e.g., Cantwell and Piscitello 2005; Ascani and 
Gagliardi 2014; Crescenzi, Gagliardi, and Iammarino 2015) and the US context (e.g., 
Alcácer and Chung 2007).  
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As extensively discussed in the international business and strategy literature, MNE 
location is also influenced by the specific characteristics of investing companies as well 
as by the diversity of corporate strategies and objectives (e.g., Xu and Shenkar 2002). 
Although this heterogeneity on the side of MNEs plays a critical role in shaping location 
choices – especially when considering its interaction with specific location attributes – 
the focus of the present article remains on the geographic aspects of MNE strategies 
while exploring the heterogeneity of MNE preferences with specific reference to both 
investment sector and function. This choice is also dictated by the nature of our data, 
which, as discussed in a later section, takes MNE investment projects as the unit of 
observation. Therefore, while our empirical analysis benefits from detailed information 
on MNE activities, it cannot explore the role of MNE intrinsic diversity, as it is instead 
customary in most qualitative studies on MNE location behavior.   
 
Economic institutions and MNEs investments  
The importance of economic institutions for economic performance and investment is 
widely acknowledged in the political economy literature (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1995; 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). Economic institutions affect the structure of incentives in 
the economy, influencing the stability and predictability of market (and non-market) 
transactions. In this sense they play a crucial role in shaping capital accumulation and 
(public and private) investments at all levels. However, empirical research has primarily 
focused on domestic capital formation, with limited attention to the importance of 
economic institutions in driving foreign investment decisions. Institutions influence 
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MNEs’ operations abroad by a) directly shaping the returns on their investments and the 
associated risk (direct effect); b) indirectly impacting upon other key investment drivers 
such as human capital and infrastructure (indirect effect) (see Knack and Keefer 1995).  
 
In particular the existing literature – still rather limited in terms of geographic coverage – 
has failed both to agree on the direct importance of institutional conditions versus other 
location drivers, and to reach a clear consensus on what typologies of institutions matter 
(if at all) for MNE investment decisions. The seminal contribution by Wheeler and Mody 
(1992) – looking at foreign investments of US Multinationals – combines a number of 
institutional indicators (including stability of labor, red tapes, quality of the legal system, 
etc.) and compares them with classical factor endowment, agglomeration and openness 
indicators. The empirical analysis concludes that US investment abroad is not driven by 
the institutional environment of the recipient economies but by other factors only 
indirectly influenced by institutions. 
 
This evidence has been challenged by a number of subsequent studies that try to open the 
institutional ‘black-box’, aiming to disentangle the relative importance of specific sub-
components of the host institutional environment and its ‘distance’ from that of the 
MNE’s home country. Very diverse sets of institutional conditions have been tested in 
different studies under the constraint of data availability for different groups of countries 
and time periods. Wei (2000) is the first study to re-open the debate by means of a 
comprehensive data set on bilateral FDI flows: his results suggest a negative relationship 
between corruption in the host country and FDI. Campos and Kinoshita (2003) suggest 
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that bureaucracy quality and rule of law are relevant drivers of FDI, while Globerman and 
Shapiro (2002) look at both inward and outward FDI in a large sample of countries, 
finding a significant and positive association between MNEs’ investments and a 
composite indicator of institutional quality. Meon and Sekkat (2004) investigate the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economies suggesting that it is political risk in 
general, rather than one particular institutional aspect, which limits FDI into a given 
country in the area. Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet and Mayer (2007, 780) – who look at the link 
between bilateral FDI flows and institutional quality (captured by means of Fraser 
Institute indicators as in the present article) – conclude that “good institutions almost 
always increase the amount of FDI received”, at the same time stressing the heterogeneity 
associated to distance in terms of institutional arrangements between the origin and the 
destination country of the investment.   
 
A few complementary studies have looked at MNE location strategies at the sub-national 
level: within countries the degree of economic integration is higher and (formal) 
institutional arrangements are generally more homogenous, making it easier to capture 
the impact of other aspects of governance quality. Phelps et al. (2003) find evidence of 
the importance of sub-national supportive institutions in different areas of the UK. Du, Lu 
and Tao (2008) investigate the location decisions of US MNEs investing in Chinese 
provinces over the period 1993-2001 by looking at several indices of economic 
institutions. Using a conditional logit model the authors suggest that US MNE location 
behavior reacts positively to stronger protection of property rights, relatively limited role 
of government in business, lower government corruption and more adequate contracting 
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environment. These elements provide strong incentives to US MNEs to locate in Chinese 
provinces.  
 
Regulations, legal environments, and government intervention 
Another small number of studies have concentrated their attention on specific economic 
institutions and MNE behavior. Three key dimensions emerge as the core components of 
economic institutions with a potential direct impact on the location decisions of foreign 
investments: regulatory framework conditions (with reference to both labor and capital 
investments, i.e. labor market and business regulations respectively), the legal 
environment (property rights and contracts’ enforcement) and the role of public 
expenditure in the economy (government intervention). 
Existing literature on the relationship between labor market regulation and foreign 
investment is scant. Using OECD data, Dewitt, Görg and Montagna (2003) highlight that 
unfavorable employment protection differential between destination and origin countries 
is harmful for investment. Other studies suggest that more flexible labor markets in 
recipient countries are positively correlated to higher inflows of investment from abroad 
(Javorcik and Spatareanu 2005). On the other hand, locating in a country with a more 
regulated labor market could be associated with a firm’s higher productivity: thus, some 
stages of production or certain sectors will tend to locate in more regulated labour 
markets (Haucap, Wey, and Barmbold 1997).  Therefore, beyond the conventional belief 
and weak evidence that more rigid labor markets represent a cost for foreign investors, it 
is possible to argue that countries with different labor market regulations attract different 
types of foreign investment. For instance, Lee (2003) suggests that the existence of labor 
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unions positively affects firms’ greenfield location of new plants in the Korean 
automotive industry.  
 
As Djankov, McLiesh, and Ramalho (2006) demonstrate, more business-friendly 
environments can be attractive for MNEs, given they can operate in a context where 
bureaucratic and administrative costs are less daunting. Daude and Stein (2007) suggest 
that the regulatory quality is the single most important investment driver. Similar 
conclusions are reached by Kaditi (2013) looking at South-eastern European countries. 
Positive effects of a more deregulated business environment are also suggested by 
Kaplan, Piedra and Seira (2011): however, the latter study also highlights that such 
effects are only temporary and much less important than conventional wisdom holds. 
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) conclude that it is not regulation per se that matters but 
the effectiveness of its implementation and enforcement. 
The role of property rights is widely debated in the existing literature on economic 
institutions. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) claim that the protection of 
property rights plays a crucial role in shaping long-run development trajectories. First, 
more secure property rights both encourage individuals to invest and raise return rates by 
protecting against expropriation from the government or powerful groups (Besley 1995;). 
Secondly, uncertain property rights may determine costs that individuals have to pay to 
protect their property. Thirdly, secure property rights may facilitate gains from trade by 
enabling the mobility of assets as factors of production (Besley 1995). As a consequence, 
MNEs may prefer locations where property rights are better acknowledged and rightfully 
protected by the legal system. Again there is no consensus in the empirical literature on 
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the practical importance of this particular institutional aspect: Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet and 
Mayer (2007) and Du, Lu and Tao (2008) find a positive and significant effect, while 
Daniele and Marani (2011) suggest that only organized crime works as a deterrent for 
foreign investments while there is no effect of other property rights infringements. 
 
Institutions that support contract enforcement are also important here given these help 
make market transactions, dispute resolution, and the general functioning of the economy 
more predictable.  In this respect, Markusen (2001) suggests that MNEs benefit from 
locations with strong and reliable contract enforcement since they can credibly commit to 
investment. Daude and Stein (2007) find a positive and significant impact in a large cross 
section of world economies, Kaditi (2013) confirms this result for Southern-European 
countries and Du, Lu and Tao (2008) find evidence that better contract enforcement in 
Chinese regions attracts US multinationals.  
 
Finally, government interventions or its excessive management economic institutions 
could lead to inefficiencies and rent-seeking (Shleifer and Vishny 1999). Therefore, 
MNEs may prefer location where governments play a relatively marginal role in the 
economy (e.g., Du, Lu and Tao 2008).  On the other hand, however, governments often 
buy products from foreign firms, either directly or through state-owned enterprises, or 
purchase goods from domestic firms that are vertically connected with MNEs’ 
subsidiaries. In this sense, larger public sector consumption may be an appealing feature 
for MNEs since it increases the size of host countries’ markets.  
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Data: Measuring MNE investment and institutional conditions 
We employ information on individual investment projects undertaken by MNEs over the 
period 2003-2008 provided by the FDi Markets-Financial Times Business database, 
which includes all cross-border greenfield and brownfield investment.
3
 Foreign firms’ 
operations are identified by Financial Times analysts through a wide variety of sources, 
including nearly 9,000 media sources, project data from over 1,000 industry 
organizations and investment agencies, and data purchased from market research and 
publication companies. Furthermore, each project is cross-referenced across multiple 
sources and more than 90 percent of investment projects are validated with company 
sources. As Crescenzi, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2014) show, investment decisions 
captured by this database are highly correlated with other macro-level data on FDI from 
UNCTAD and the World Bank.  
 
In more specific terms, this article focuses on investment projects originated in EU-15 
countries and directed towards EU New Member States (NMS) and European 
Neighboring Countries (NCs), the latter being Accession Countries (ACC), European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) countries and the Russian Federation.
4
 Since the aim of the 
analysis here is to investigate MNE location choices, only data on greenfield investment 
are considered, since the location of brownfield investment is clearly a function of 
greenfield investments undertaken in previous periods: hence, only greenfield investment 
are subject to a choice based on location attributes. A further relevant consideration to 
                                                 
3
 In this database joint ventures are tracked only when they lead to new physical operations, whereas 
Mergers & Acquisitions as well as other equity investment are not included. Overall, the inclusion in the 
dataset is conditional on the fact that investment projects generate new employment or capital investment. 
4
 Investment from the EU-27 and the whole world towards the same destination countries are also 
employed to test the attractiveness of the countries of interest with different samples. 
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make is associated with the existence of repeated investment undertaken by the same 
MNE over time. In presence of repeated investment, future locations decisions could be 
influenced by past investment. However, the proportion of this type of investment is very 
limited in our data. This is not surprising considering the relatively short time span 
considered, and the fact that most MNEs do not open new establishment very often in 
such a limited period of time in the geographic area under analysis. 
 
Table 1 provides information on new investment projects in 2003-2008 originating from 
EU-15 countries in NMS (panel A) and NCs, that is Balkan and Eastern countries (panel 
B) and Northern African and Middle East countries (panel C). It is not surprising that 
about 62 percent of EU-15 investors still choose to remain in the EU by selecting a 
destination among NMS.
5
 In this area, Romania, Poland and Hungary are the top three 
destinations, with about 14.7 percent, 10.9 percent and 9.8 percent of EU-15 investment, 
respectively. The trend over the 2000s, however, suggests that the huge attractiveness of 
NMS reached its peak in anticipation to the full EU membership and it is now declining, 
replicating a pattern rather typical of previous EU enlargements and restructuring. In the 
NCs, instead, MNEs’ presence has increased particularly since the mid-2000s. In terms of 
cumulative inflows, the most selected destination outside the European Union is Russia, 
with a share of 19 percent. The rest of the Balkans and the East attracts an additional 10 
percent of EU-15 investment in the area, whilst Northern Africa and Middle East account 
for about 8 percent.  
 
                                                 
5
 Most of NMS entered the EU in 2004, while Romania and Bulgaria joined in 2007. 
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[Table 1 around here] 
Institutional Conditions 
A large number of institutional variables are publicly available, ranging from measures of 
governance to political indicators. Nevertheless, as mentioned in previous sections, this 
article is primarily concerned with the notion of economic institutions. The aim is in fact 
to cover some aspects of national institutional settings that directly characterize a 
country’s economic life and affect the degree of attractiveness towards foreign 
investment.  
 
In line with other existing studies on foreign investment and institutions (e.g. Bénassy-
Quéré, Coupet, and Mayer 2007), we employ data from the Fraser Institute as it provides 
information for all countries covered in our analysis. This dataset contains a number of 
indicators reflecting several economic dimensions of national institutional contexts. In 
particular, we employ the following four measures of institutional quality: labor market 
regulation, business regulation, protection of property rights, and legal enforcement of 
contracts. In addition, we use data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI) to include the relevance of government expenditure in destination countries. With 
these five indicators we cover three main areas of the economic-institutional 
environment: (i) regulatory aspects (in labour market and business), (ii) legal aspects 
(property rights and contract enforcement), and (iii) extent of public intervention in the 
economy.  
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Labor market regulation: our variable for labor market regulation proxies the 
flexibility of national labor markets. This is an index encompassing information 
on countries’ hiring and firing rules, collective bargaining, worker dismissal costs, 
conscription, working hours and minimum wage. Higher values of the index are 
associated to more flexible regulatory settings.  
 
Business regulation: this indicator includes costs associated to bureaucracy, taxes, 
bribes and other administrative burdens that may discourage MNEs from starting 
a business in a country. As above, this is an index with higher values reflecting a 
less regulated environment.  
 
Protection of property rights: we measure property rights protection by means of 
an index assuming higher values when property rights are more protected.  
Legal enforcement of contracts: this aspect refers to the capacity and effectiveness 
of courts to enforce rules and contracts between parties. This is measured with an 
index taking higher values for countries with better contracting environments.  
 
Government intervention: we employ the percentage of general government’s 
final consumption expenditure on GDP, as provided by the World Bank’s WDI.  
 
Table 1 above includes information on the characteristics of the economic institutions of 
the countries under analysis. Institutional conditions are heterogeneous across the 
countries of the EU geographic vicinity but generally comparable. The NMs show, on 
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average, higher values of the institutional indicators and generally higher shares of public 
expenditure in total GDP when compared to other countries in the group. The Balkans 
and the East, in comparison with the NMs, show lower average values for the economic 
institution indicators: this group includes some countries candidate to EU membership, a 
process that formally requires gradual institutional convergence towards EU standards. 
The final set of countries includes Northern Africa and the Middle East. In this group 
average values of the institutional indicators are upward biased by Israel and Jordan: after 
excluding these latter two countries, the average institutional quality of the area is lower 
than in the other groups. Overall, the countries covered in the analysis offer an ample 
variety of institutional arrangements that is deemed particularly suitable to test the 
location behavior of MNEs. 
 
Other location drivers 
The analysis of the link between MNE location choices and economic institutions 
requires taking into account other relevant characteristics of the host economies. In line 
with the literature on MNE location choices, this article employs several control variables 
that reflect different potential drivers for the localization strategies of MNEs.  
 
First, demand is considered as one of the main factors attracting European investors into 
foreign markets. Both internal and external demand is taken into account. Internal 
demand fundamentally reflects the market size of the host countries and it is measured 
through their own GDP at constant prices, in 2005 US dollars. In line with theory and 
existing evidence, it is expected that a larger market size will attract more foreign 
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investors (Wheeler and Mody 1992). External demand is instead captured by means of a 
standard market potential indicator á la Harris (1954), as customary in the literature. 
Similar to the internal market demand, it is expected that market potential is positively 
associated with the location strategies of MNEs. 
 
Trade costs are controlled for by employing a measure of geographic distance between 
the most populated cities of origin and destination countries in the sample: intuitively, 
greater geographic distance is expected to discourage foreign investors (Bevan and Estrin 
2004). Furthermore, a dummy variable indicating national border contiguity between 
origin and destination countries is included.  
 
Some characteristics of national labor markets are also controlled for. The education level 
of host countries is taken into account by means of the ratio of secondary school age 
population to total population. Notwithstanding the existence of better proxies of human 
capital at the national level, this appears to be the only available indicator for the 
destination countries in our sample. A positive relationship is expected between this 
variable and the location of MNEs. Moreover, the effect of average wage is indirectly 
captured through per capita GDP. Indeed, wage data are rarely available for most 
destination countries in the sample and per capita GDP may represent a fair alternative. A 
negative relationship is expected between this proxy for input cost and MNEs location 
behavior. 
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Furthermore, different measures of agglomeration economies are considered. The 
percentage of urban population on total population is included to control for the relative 
importance of cities in generating externalities (Glaeser et al., 1992; Head, Ries, and 
Swenson 1995). An indicator for the stock of past foreign investment in location j is 
constructed. This measure captures firm-specific agglomeration effects that may derive 
from the advantages accruing to an MNE by locating where other MNEs have previously 
invested. Hence, the existing stock of investment should inform whether firms’ past 
experience drives further location decisions (Basile, Castellani, and Zanfei 2008). In 
constructing this variable available information on brownfield investment is also 
considered because corporate expansions signal to a new investor that previous 
multinational firms attach additional importance to a specific location. Since the mere 
count of investment projects undertaken in previous years does not reveal much about 
investors’ behavior, the analysis takes into consideration the potential occurrence of a 
‘national ownership’ effect in each time period, which would suggests the existence of 
patterns in the strategies of MNEs on the basis of their nationality. Therefore, a stock 
variable is generated for each location according to the MNEs’ country of origin: in line 
with studies exploring the role of agglomeration externalities, a positive relationship is 
expected with the location choice (Wheeler and Mody 1992). The inclusion of this 
variable should also capture the influence that repeated investment operated by the same 
MNE has on future investment location decisions, although, however, the share of 
repeated investment in the data is not relevant (see above). 
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A set of cultural variables includes dummies indicating whether origin and destination 
countries share cultural characteristics, thereby controlling for whether countries speak 
common official or unofficial languages, had a common colonizer after 1945, had a 
colonial relationship after 1945, and have been a single national entity. These variables 
are frequently employed in studies on the internationalization decisions of firms (Rauch 
1999).  Finally, national fixed effects are included to control for any unobserved factor 
that operates at the country level and may play a role in attracting foreign investment.  
Table A.1 in Appendix A (available online) provides a description of all variables 
employed in the analysis; all are available for years from 2003 to 2008. 
 
Capturing MNEs heterogeneous preferences for economic institutions: Mixed Logit 
Models 
Following McFadden (1974), the great majority of the empirical literature on investment 
location decisions implies that MNE strategies are fundamentally driven by individual 
maximization choices. In other words, it is thought that MNEs select locations on the 
basis of the expected utility or profit that each site may yield on the basis of the 
characteristics of the host economies. Conditional Logit (CL) models allow exploring the 
effect of alternative-specific attributes on the probabilities that firms select a particular 
location among the set of alternatives. The main assumption in the CL is the 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), which implies that the error term εij is 
independent across locations.  
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An extension of the analysis of MNE location behavior is developed by implementing a 
Mixed Logit (MXL) model. This is basically a generalization of the standard logit and 
offers the possibility to relax completely any restriction associated with the IIA. The 
existing literature on MNE location choices has rarely employed MXL, despite the 
advantages associated to it. Notable exceptions are relatively recent and include works by 
Defever (2006, 2012), Cheng (2008) and Basile, Castellani and Zanfei (2008). The 
present analysis implements a random-coefficient derivation of the MXL, in line with 
Defever (2006, 2012) and Cheng (2008), with the aim of analyzing whether MNEs have 
heterogeneous preferences over location attributes when they strategically select a 
location for greenfield investment.
6
 The analysis of the literature has shown that it is 
unrealistic to expect unambiguous results. Indeed, this article aims to test if the lack of 
consensus on the role of specific institutional features of host economies might be 
explained precisely by the heterogeneity of MNEs’ preferences over specific institutional 
attributes. It is plausible that some MNEs tend to prefer locations with weaker economic 
institutions because they aim at bypassing or eluding transparent market mechanisms 
when undertaking business operations abroad. For instance, weaker economic institutions 
might facilitate rent-seeking or moral hazard behavior, the creation of monopolistic 
positions, or simply allow capturing a share of host countries’ public resources, through 
lobbying, subsidies or less legalized channels, such as corruption. This is particularly 
relevant in the case of the present study since the locations of interest encompass several 
transition and developing economies that are characterized by little transparency, weak 
democratic decision-making processes as well as strong vested interests that may 
                                                 
6
 Basile, Castellani and Zanfei (2008) adopt an error-component derivation aimed at investigating 
substitution patterns among alternative locations. 
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influence market mechanisms. To take this into consideration, random coefficients are 
attached to variables of economics institutions, while fixed coefficients are kept for the 
remaining location drivers. 
 
Accounting for heterogeneity of MNE locations’ characteristics formally means that the 
parameter β, associated with an observable characteristic x of location j, can vary 
randomly across MNEs.  Formally, the profit equation that each firm maximizes when 
investing abroad can be specified as: 
 
(1)                                                            𝜋𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽𝑖
′𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
 
where the vector of parameters β′  for firm i reflects firm’s preference over observable 
location attributes x. Thus, in the setting of random-coefficient MLX parameters β are not 
fixed as in CL, but they can reveal MNEs’ taste variation regarding location 
characteristics. Coefficients vary across MNEs in the population with distribution density 
f (β). Following Train (2003), each MNE knows its own βi (as well as εij) for all 
alternatives and select the location that offers higher profit. However, random coefficients 
βi remain unobserved and it is only possible to specify a distribution for them
7
. By doing 
this, parameters θ (i.e. mean b and standard deviation s) of the coefficients βi can be 
estimated. In this article, a normal distribution is specified for random coefficients 
associated with economic institutions
8
. Thus, the analysis will inform whether MNEs 
                                                 
7
 If the researcher knows βi, this would allow estimating a choice probability similar to CL. 
8
 The rationale for this choice is that we expect coefficients on economic institutions to take either a 
positive or a negative sign. Conversely, by specifying log-normal distributions for coefficients on economic 
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exhibit heterogeneous tastes over different economic institutional settings. The 
unconditional choice probability to be estimated takes the following form: 
 
(2)                                               𝑃𝑖𝑗 = ∫ (
𝑒𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑒𝛽′𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑘
) 𝑓(𝛽|𝜃)𝑑𝛽 
 
This is the MXL probability, which basically consists of a weighted average of the 
product of logit equations evaluated at different values of β and where weights depend on 
the density f (β | θ) (Train 2003). As mentioned, the aim is to estimate parameters θ, 
which is possible by means of simulation methods, which allow approximating 
probabilities for any given value of parameters θ. Thus, the simulated probability SP is 
initially computed as an average probability at different levels of β: 
 
(3)                                                           𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑗 =
1
𝑅
∑
𝑒𝛽
𝑟𝑥𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑒𝛽𝑟𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑘
𝑅
𝑟=1
 
 
where R is the number of draws, or replications. Basically, for calculating the SPij, the 
logit equation (2) is computed with each draw r, and eventually averaged. In the present 
analysis, R=500. Successively, SPij is entered into the log-likelihood function to obtain 
the following simulated log-likelihood SLL: 
 
(4)                                                       𝑆𝐿𝐿 = ∑ ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝐼
𝑖=1
 
                                                                                                                                                 
institution variables, we would impose that the signs of these coefficients are the same for all MNEs (either 
positive or negative). 
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where yij=1 if firm i chooses location j, zero otherwise. Therefore, it is possible to obtain 
the Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) estimator which takes the value of θ that 
maximizes SLL.  
 
Empirical Results  
All estimations are conducted for EU-15 MNEs investing in European New Member 
States, Candidate/Accession, ENP countries and the Russian Federation. Additionally, 
estimations on investment from the EU-27 and the whole world are also run as a 
benchmark and robustness check in order to increase the size of the sample of foreign 
investments.
9
  
 
Baseline results 
Table 2 presents the results from CL estimations. Column 1 provides information for the 
baseline specification. The results suggest that three out of five indicators of the quality 
of economic institutions exhibit a positive and statistically significant relationship with 
the location decisions of MNEs
10
: business regulation, government expenditure and legal 
enforcement of contracts. Conversely, labor market regulation and property rights 
protection are not significant. This specification includes controls for market demand 
variables, proxies for trade costs (i.e., geographic distance between origin and destination 
countries and a dummy for contiguity), as well as dummies for cultural characteristics. 
                                                 
9
 CL results are qualitatively identical to EU-15 results and are available upon request. The main MXL 
results are included in the tables. A log likelihood-ratio test is performed to confirm the relevance of the 
mixed logit over the conditional logit (results available upon request). 
10
 In addition, to alleviate any concern associated with the possibility to treat only some institutional 
variables as random, it is important to highlight the  very small p-value score (0.0000) on the chi-squared 
test for the joint significance of the standard deviations associated to the random covariates of economic 
institutions. 
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All controls show the expected sign. Next, in columns 2 and 3, labor market 
characteristics such as education level of the population and average wage are included. 
Both enter the regression with the expected signs, although average wage is only weakly 
significant. Finally, we take into account agglomeration forces in the last two columns of 
Table 2. These turn out to be strongly correlated with the location strategies of MNEs. 
With the gradual inclusion of all our controls, the relevance of economic institutions 
evidenced in column 1 remains unchanged. MNEs from EU-15 appear to be sensitive to 
some aspects of the national economic institutional setting of host countries. More 
favorable business regulation, a stronger presence of the state in the economy and an 
appropriate contracting environment are positively correlated with the decisions of MNEs 
to locate a new establishment through a greenfield FDI.  
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
Moreover, our more extended specification (column 5) suggests that internal market size 
is positively associated with MNE decisions, whereas market potential becomes non-
significant. Similarly, education loses importance, probably indicating that MNEs from 
EU-15 delocalize in the area of interest some business functions for which more basic 
skills are needed. Average wage is statistically insignificant. Finally, both measures of 
agglomeration are strongly and positively associated with the dependent variable. This 
suggests that agglomeration economies potentially play a role in attracting MNEs. 
Similarly, a pattern of localization that follows national ownership lines emerges. In other 
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words, MNEs from the same country of origin tend to concentrate their investment in the 
same destinations.  
 
Overall, the CL estimations are in line with the existing literature. While it is impossible 
to find any association between MNEs and the functioning of national labor markets, a 
less regulated business environment is associated to higher intensities of MNE 
operations. Similarly, with respect to the legal aspects of economic institutions, different 
elements play different roles: the enforcement of contracts is a relevant institutional 
aspect in our analysis, suggesting that a correlation exists between the respect of formal 
contracts and the patterns of MNE investment. On the other hand, property rights 
protection does not appear to be associated to location decisions. Finally, the role of the 
state is positively and significantly associated with MNE choices, presumably because 
MNEs can take advantage from public intervention in the economy or because national 
governments expenditure is also aimed at consumption. These results suggest that a 
further investigation of the heterogeneity of MNE preferences is appropriate: thus, the 
following analysis explores the relationship between MNE strategic behavior and the 
economic institutional environment of recipient economies by means of MXL. This 
approach makes it also possible to relax the IIA assumption that treats the substitution of 
alternative locations rather unrealistically. 
 
Preference heterogeneity 
In the MXL estimations heterogeneity is allowed to occur only for coefficients associated 
with economic institutions (variables of interest), while other regressors are kept fixed. 
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Therefore, MXL estimates coefficient parameters θ, namely means b and standard 
deviations s, for variables that are specified to be random. MXL estimation results are 
presented in Table 3, where the extended specification is run for EU-15, EU-27 and 
world MNEs (columns 1, 3, and 5, respectively). As far as economic institutions are 
concerned, previous results are largely confirmed by the estimated means b of 
coefficients. Regulation is positively associated with MNEs location choices in the 
context of national business environments, but not in labor markets, although the mean 
coefficient for the latter is weakly significant when we consider MNEs from the whole 
world. A strong role of government expenditure in the countries under analysis is also 
significantly associated with MNEs location strategies, potentially because this is 
perceived as a positive signal by EU-15 MNEs and world MNEs, while it does not seem 
to be very relevant for the EU-27 sample (possibly because some of these investors are 
from NMS, which may be relatively more deterred by a large government role in the host 
economy). With respect to the national legal framework, a more effective contracting 
environment represents an important location factor for foreign investment for all MNEs 
across specifications; as in previous results, property rights protection exhibits 
insignificant mean coefficients. 
 
The MXL estimation also provides standard deviations s for the coefficients of economic 
institutions, which are specified to vary randomly. Some of the estimated standard 
deviations of these coefficients are statistically significant, suggesting that parameters do 
vary across the population of MNEs under analysis. Therefore, standard deviations can be 
interpreted as heterogeneity terms and suggest that different MNEs attach different 
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importance to economic institutions, explaining the lack of consensus in the existing 
literature on the importance of some of their components. Values of b and s are employed 
in columns 2, 4 and 6 in order to gain insights on the extent of the heterogeneous 
preferences of MNE strategies over economic institutions. For instance, in the case of 
EU-15 MNEs, the variable for business regulation takes parameters b=0.475 and 
s=0.472, such that for 84.4 percent of the MNE population the parameter is above zero, 
while for the 15.6 percent it is below. In other words, the large majority of FDI 
originating in the EU-15 systematically locates where doing business is characterized by 
weaker bureaucratic burdens, while the rest locates where business is more strongly 
regulated. This figure only varies slightly when EU-27 and world MNEs are considered 
(80.2 percent and 76.1 percent, respectively). More heterogeneous preferences emerge 
when we look at parameters related to the protection of property rights. In the case of EU-
15 and EU-27 MNEs, estimates indicate that the population is indeed split into two 
halves. This balance between shares of the population with respect to opposite 
preferences over property rights protection also explains the insignificance of the mean 
coefficient. Finally, as far as the legal enforcement of contracts is concerned, taste 
variation over this aspect of economic institutions is far less pronounced, with most 
MNEs location choices being associated to destinations where the contracting 
environment is generally certain. Nevertheless, there is a very small portion of MNEs in 
the population that tends to locate where contract enforcement is weaker. 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
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Figure 1 depicts probability density functions for economic institutions by employing 
parameters estimated by MXL: the graphs refer to those aspects of economic institutions 
that exhibit significant heterogeneity terms s.  The heterogeneity of these relationships, 
particularly regarding property rights, poses interesting questions on MNEs strategies and 
their motives for investing abroad. The source of heterogeneous tastes may be associated 
with unobserved factors operating at the firm-level. Therefore, in order to explore the 
systematic nature of heterogeneity of preferences over economic institutions, the MXL 
models are run by exploiting information for sectors and business activities of the 
investment projects undertaken by MNEs. Data in FDi Markets provides information on 
these aspects. On this basis, following the NACE (rev.1.1) classification, we group 
sectors into four categories: High-Medium Technology Manufacturing, Medium-Low 
Technology Manufacturing, Knowledge-intensive Services (KIS) and Less-knowledge-
intensive Services (LKIS). Similarly, following Crescenzi, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti 
(2014), we generate three alternative groups of business functions: Headquarters and 
innovative activities (HQ & Inno); Services, sales and logistics (SSL); Production. Tables 
A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A show the classification of sectors and business functions, 
respectively. 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
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Table 4 presents the results for MXL estimations of EU-15 location decisions performed 
for different sectors
11
. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, regressions are run for High-
Medium Technology Manufacturing sectors. The MXL reveals that regulation of labor 
markets does not influence MNE decisions, while the intervention of the regulator in 
business exhibits an ambiguous association with investment projects: the majority of 
MNEs in High-Medium Technology Manufacturing target countries where administrative 
and bureaucratic aspects of running a business are less invasive (62.9 percent), while the 
rest are in countries where businesses are subject to more regulation. Government 
expenditure does not play any role in driving MNEs’ behavior in these sectors. As far as 
legal aspects are concerned, MNEs in High-Medium Technology activities attach 
importance to property rights protection only in 33 percent of cases. This result might 
seem surprising since it implies that a large group of MNEs from EU-15 investing in the 
area of neighboring countries is located where less robust property rights exist. However, 
this suggests that MNEs operating in High-Medium Tech sectors might strategically 
exploit a weaker enforcement of property rights to facilitate domestic firms’ upgrading 
and learning (for example in the area of intellectual property rights, IPRs), while MNEs 
rely on internal firm-level protection mechanisms (see Wu [2000] for the case of IPRs in 
China). With respect to the legal enforcement of contracts, almost three quarters of MNEs 
in High-Medium Technology Manufacturing systematically locate in places where this 
aspect of economic institutions is more adequately protected.  
 
[Table 4 around here] 
                                                 
11
 Plots of the heterogeneous relationships that emerge from the estimations are available upon request. 
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Columns 3 and 4 report results for Medium-Low Technology Manufacturing. EU-15 
MNEs in these activities react more homogeneously to the quality of national economic 
institutions than those in High-Medium Technology Manufacturing sectors. Indeed, a 
very large share of MNEs seems to consider strong regulation in business as an obstacle 
(87.1 percent). Also the coefficient on labor market regulation turns to be marginally 
significant and positive, suggesting that MNEs in these activities tend to prefer countries 
where labor markets are more flexible, although the statistical relevance of this 
relationship remains weak. This finding is perfectly plausible since we are considering 
EU-15 MNEs that localize in the EU neighborhood area operations characterized by a 
lower level of sophistication. This is also evidenced by the strongly negative coefficient 
associated to our proxy for average wage, signaling that MNEs in Medium-Low 
Technology Manufacturing sectors can be motivated by the supply of inexpensive 
workforce that is generally low-skilled. With respect to government expenditure, we find 
that the mean coefficient b is not significant and the standard deviation s is only weakly 
significant. Although these parameters provide a figure of 99.9 percent of MNEs driven 
by more public spending, they should be cautiously interpreted given their very low 
statistical significance. MNEs in Medium-Low Technology Manufacturing activities do 
not seem to be sensitive to the degree of protection of property rights, while there is a 
clear correlation with locations characterized by stronger enforcement of legal contracts.  
 
With respect to control variables, MNEs in High-Medium and Medium-Low 
Manufacturing sectors seem to be associated with different factors. Geographic distance 
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and the previous presence of MNEs from the same origin country are the only common 
trait in MNEs strategies. MNEs in High-Medium Technology Manufacturing activities 
are substantially associated with agglomeration forces, suggesting that MNEs tend to 
concentrate this kind of activities in urban areas where they can access a larger supply of 
labor and competences. Surprisingly, the education level of the population remains 
statistically insignificant, although our proxy for human capital only takes into account 
secondary education, which is probably inadequate for High-Medium Technology 
activities. MNEs in Medium-Low Technology Manufacturing activities, instead, can be 
connected to market-seeking and efficiency-seeking rationales, as suggested by the 
strongly significant coefficients of market size and average wage. This finding is in line 
with the great majority of literature on FDI in transition economies, which highlight that 
foreign investors search for new markets as well as cheap labor in Central and Eastern 
European countries (Resmini 2000). 
 
The right-hand part of Table 4 reports results for services: columns 5 and 6 regard KIS, 
whilst columns 7 and 8 present results for LKIS. MNEs decisions in KIS are invariably 
correlated with business regulation and the legal enforcement of contracts. Again, 
parameters on property rights suggest that this element is an ambiguous element in 
shaping EU-15 MNE strategies in EU neighboring countries. As far as LKIS activities are 
concerned, results only slightly vary. The enforcement of contracts turns out to be 
unimportant for this kind of services, whilst investment strategies in LKIS seem to be 
positively linked to labor markets that are more regulated and to larger government 
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spending. Control variables in these regressions reveal that KIS benefit of a more 
educated workforce and also that location choices globally follow nationality patterns.  
 
Table 5 presents the results of MXL performed for different groups of business 
functions
12
.  Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 refer to operations of MNEs in HQ and Inno 
activities. Parameters on economic institutions are only significant with respect to 
business regulation and property rights protection. The former exhibits a weak and 
positive mean coefficient b, while the latter is still affected by a significant heterogeneity 
term s that splits the distribution of preferences into two halves. Our proxy for human 
capital, although positive, is not statistically significant, likely due to the fact that we only 
consider secondary education. In general, we do not detect strong coefficients analyzing 
the location decisions of MNEs as far as HQ & Inno activities are concerned. A different 
picture emerges instead for SSL activities (columns 3 and 4). A more flexible regulation 
of business operations is a positively correlated with location strategies for the great 
majority of MNEs (83.4 percent); whilst for the regulation in the labor market almost 60 
percent of MNEs have a positive perception of flexibility, the rest seem to have a 
preference for more regulated frameworks. With respect to legal aspects, nearly all MNE 
location choices are connected to a more solid legal enforcement of contracts (92.1 
percent). In addition, SSL can be suggestively interpreted as market-seeking motivated, 
as emerging from the coefficient on internal demand. Also, MNE location is correlated to 
a relatively educated and less expensive labor force.  Finally, columns 5 and 6 provide 
MXL results for production activities, whose picture appears less complex than for other 
                                                 
12
 Plots of the heterogeneous relationships that emerge from the estimations are available upon request. 
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business functions. Economic institutions have a very homogeneous impact and 
heterogeneity terms are never relevant: more flexible regulation in business, stronger 
government spending and relative easiness in enforcing legal contracts are similarly 
related to MNE production operations. Moreover, control variables suggest that 
production activities of EU-15 MNEs are located where larger national markets are 
present, and they also tend to be associated with local low-skilled and cheap labor.  
 
[Table 5 around here] 
 
 
Conclusions 
In recent years the EU has intensified economic and institutional integration with its 
neighboring countries, though with different intensity. Some countries have become EU 
members, some are candidate for membership, and some others are part of the European 
Neighboring Policy. In this scenario of growing integration, European MNEs have 
increased their operations in neighboring countries through the setting up of new foreign 
affiliates.  
 
This article has examined how recipient countries’ economic institutions shape the 
location strategies of EU-15 MNEs in a large set of developing and transition countries 
that are geographically close to the EU. In so doing, the article contributes to the 
literature on MNE location behavior by exploring the heterogeneity of MNE preferences 
for the economic institutions of the countries hosting their investment. This heterogeneity 
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– largely overlooked in previous quantitative analyses – is unveiled, quantified and linked 
to the different sectors of economic activity and business functions of investment projects 
by means of a random-coefficient MXL, rarely adopted in studies on firms’ location 
decisions.  
 
Table 6 provides an overall summary of the results on MNE heterogeneous preferences 
for economic institutions. In line with the existing literature our results confirm that the 
flexibility of the labor market – one of the top items in ‘traditional’ institutional reform 
packages – is not systematically associated with the attraction of foreign investments. On 
the contrary, favorable business regulation is clearly correlated with MNE location 
choices: when looking at the entire sample of MNEs large part of the distribution attaches 
a positive value to this characteristic. In addition the heterogeneity of preferences seems 
to be largely linked to the most sophisticated activities in sectoral (High-Medium tech 
sectors) and functional (HQs and Inno) terms.  
 
The analysis of the role of the protection of property rights explains why the existing 
literature has so far failed to reach a clear consensus on its importance: MNEs are indeed 
strongly divided with reference to this specific dimension, particularly in the case of the 
most sophisticated sectors and functions. Conversely, for the enforcement of contracts the 
results highlight clear-cut MNEs’ preferences for more ‘certain’ framework conditions 
across sectors (with the exception of LKI sectors) and functions. Finally, the relevance of 
public expenditure seems to be limited to production activities, where the government 
plays an important role in supporting demand. 
38 
 
 
 
[Table 6 around here] 
 
These results should be interpreted with caution. First, it is important to bear in mind that 
the methodology makes it impossible to draw any causal conclusions. The analysis of 
location patterns is able to control for a large number of possible confounding factors but 
reverse causality is still a possibility. Second, the time span covered by the analysis is still 
limited and the global economic crisis started in 2008, as well as the dramatic political 
changes in some of the countries covered in the analysis, call for extra care in the 
interpretation of the findings. Third, even though the innovative use of quantitative 
methods makes it possible to shed new light on the heterogeneous behavior of MNEs 
with reference to economic institutions, more qualitative work is necessary (and is in our 
agenda for future research) in order to explore the firm-specific determinants of MNEs’ 
diversified preferences. 
 
Having acknowledged these limitations, our results provide policy makers with relevant 
insights to support institutional reform and institution building initiatives as tools to favor 
(and complement) internationalization processes. The empirical results suggest that some 
MNEs prefer locations where specific dimensions of economic institutions are weaker. 
This may appear counterintuitive, but indeed there could be situations in which economic 
actors may prefer loose economic institutions in order to gain selective economic 
rewards. This institutional subversion phenomenon is particularly well documented in the 
case of transition economies, where political and economic elites replicate a system of 
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flawed institutional environments that provide them with various types of advantage over 
the rest of the local population (Helmann 1998; Helmann, Jones, and Kaufmann 2000). 
Similarly, weak property rights allow wealthier foreign actors to benefit from 
unproductive activities such as rent-seeking, at the same time maintaining expropriation 
instruments over the rest (Sonin 2003). The subversion of economic institutions is also 
intimately associated with within-country inequality, and less secure property rights and 
weaker legal systems favor a country’s power establishment, which aims at perpetuating 
the mechanisms that allow the concentration of power and wealth (Glaeser, Scheinkman, 
and Shleifer 2003). In this vein, it is argued that political incumbents support imperfect 
institutions in order to maintain their benefits (Glaeser and Shleifer 2002). On the basis of 
these considerations, often made with respect to transition and developing countries, it 
can be argued that some MNEs are oriented towards locations where they can establish 
influential connections with political and economic elites, which in turn allow them 
taking advantage of institutional poorness by obtaining rents or circumventing market 
rules. Again, this may represent one explanation for the heterogeneity of results 
associated to the protection of property rights in particular. However, validating these 
results and investigating further the relationship between economic institutions and 
MNEs remain an open research field and a crucial challenge for policy design in a 
growing number of countries and regions worldwide.  
 
In this sense, the political behavior of MNEs is an important aspect that is often 
overlooked by academic research (Boddewyn 1988; Boddewyn and Brewer 1994), as 
well as the influence of the distance between institutional contexts – at both origin and 
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destination – on MNE heterogeneity (e.g., Xu and Shenkar 2002). Furthermore, our 
results suggest that the intra-firm organization of different segments of the production 
process is also subject to MNE heterogeneous preferences with respect to the local 
institutional environment. This represents an interesting finding in the light of the GVC 
literature (e.g., Gereffi 2014; Yeung and Coe 2015), as it provides an informative hint on 
the coordination of MNE cross-border expansion through FDI. Overall, as indicated by 
recent interdisciplinary work (e.g., Beugelsdijk, McCann, and Mudambi 2010), MNE 
firm-level heterogeneity represents a highly promising area of investigation and cross-
fertilization – both conceptually and empirically – between the fields of evolutionary 
economic geography and international business studies. A better understanding of 
heterogeneous behaviors of firms (both foreign and local) is critical to enhance place-
based policy approaches aiming at capturing intra-firm and inter-firms GVC dimensions. 
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Table 1  
EU-15 investment projects and quality of economic institutions, 2003-2008. 
 MNEs Investments Quality of Economic Institutions 
Host Countries N of investment % investment 
Labor market 
regulation 
Business regulation Protection of 
property rights 
Legal enforcement 
of contracts 
 
Government 
expenditure 
A. New Member States 
Bulgaria 551 8.00 6.96 5.60 4.09 4.77 17.97 
Czech Republic 443 6.43 7.47 5.16 5.72 3.59 21.46 
Estonia 142 2.06 5.87 7.37 7.25 6.02 17.58 
Hungary 674 9.79 6.84 6.12 6.51 7.06 22.45 
Latvia 152 2.21 6.43 6.29 5.88 7.25 18.50 
Lithuania 139 2.02 5.45 6.50 5.80 7.35 19.04 
Poland 748 10.86 6.52 5.49 4.66 4.27 18.12 
Romania 1,012 14.69 5.91 6.54 4.77 5.17 12.19 
Slovakia 319 4.63 7.61 5.85 5.98 4.59 18.42 
Slovenia 100 1.45 5.44 6.34 6.27 3.93 18.46 
Subtotal / Average* 4,280 62.14 6.45* 6.13* 5.69* 5.40* 18.42* 
B. Balkans and the East 
Albania 38 0.55 5.79 5.67 3.30 5.17 9.31 
Croatia 139 2.02 5.65 5.62 4.70 5.40 19.95 
Russia 1,315 19.09 6.03 4.73 3.34 7.53 17.38 
Turkey 298 4.33 4.09 6.29 5.06 6.16 12.34 
Ukraine 263 3.82 6.22 4.08 3.40 5.29 18.18 
Subtotal / Average* 2,053 29.81 5.56* 5.28* 3.96* 5.91* 15.43 
C. Northern Africa and Middle East 
Algeria 105 1.52 4.96 5.62 4.25 4.39 12.43 
Egypt 84 1.22 5.01 5.06 5.77 3.41 12.03 
Israel 37 0.54 4.84 6.64 6.98 3.46 25.71 
Jordan 23 0.33 8.38 6.45 7.18 3.38 22.01 
Morocco 203 2.95 3.62 6.09 5.62 4.3 18.31 
Tunisia 103 1.50 6.30 6.79 7.00 4.88 16.67 
Subtotal /Average* 555 8.06 5.52* 6.11* 6.13* 3.97* 17.86* 
Total /Overall 
Average* 6,888 100 
5.97* 5.92* 5.41* 5.11* 17.55* 
Source: own elaboration based on FDi Markets – FT Business and Fraser Institute Data
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Table 2 
Conditional Logit estimation of EU15 MNEs location behavior 
Dep.Var.: Location choice (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Labor Market Regulation 0.018 0.028 0.044 -0.004 -0.010 
 
(0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.049) (0.049) 
Business Regulation 0.401*** 0.393*** 0.382*** 0.371*** 0.434*** 
 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Government Expenditure 0.059*** 0.065*** 0.0623*** 0.067*** 0.045*** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Protection of Property Rights 0.0017 0.012 0.026 0.010 0.005 
 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Legal Enforcement of Contracts 0.567*** 0.559*** 0.560*** 0.683*** 0.591*** 
 
(0.128) (0.129) (0.127) (0.138) (0.139) 
ln Market Size t-1 -0.455 0.352 1.189 0.919 2.441** 
 
(0.781) (0.837) (0.961) (0.974) (0.988) 
ln Market Potential t-1 1.728** 2.405*** 2.591*** 2.044** 0.979 
 
(0.860) (0.891) (0.896) (0.911) (0.917) 
Distance -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln Education Level 
 
1.291*** 0.977** 0.487 0.709 
  
(0.470) (0.495) (0.527) (0.530) 
ln Average Wage 
  
-1.343* -0.402 -0.963 
   
(0.777) (0.854) (0.860) 
Urban Agglomeration 
   
0.149** 0.151*** 
    
(0.058) (0.058) 
National Ownership 
    
0.003*** 
     
(0.001) 
Observations 148,783 148,783 148,783 148,783 148,783 
Cultural dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic contiguity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
National dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.193 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.196 
log likelihood -17084 -17080 -17078 -17075 -17037 
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Table 3 
Mixed Logit estimation of MNEs location behavior 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
    EU15 MNEs      EU27 MNEs      World MNEs 
Dep. Var.: Location Choice θ Value % > 0 Value % > 0 Value % > 0 
                
Labor Market Regulation b 0.007 
 
0.024 
 
0.072* 
 
  
(0.051) 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.039) 
 
 
s 0.015 
 
0.171 
 
0.008 
 
  
(0.036) 
 
(0.192) 
 
(0.016) 
 Business Regulation b 0.475*** 84.4% 0.522*** 80.2% 0.403*** 76.1% 
  
(0.064) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.047) 
 
 
s 0.472*** 
 
0.613*** 
 
0.567*** 
 
  
(0.113) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.074) 
 Government Expenditure b 0.035** 
 
0.021 
 
0.025** 
 
  
(0.016) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.012) 
 
 
s 0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 Protection of Property Rights b 0.002 50.4% 0.035 54.4% 0.001 
 
  
(0.043) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.032) 
 
 
s 0.229** 
 
0.322*** 
 
0.133 
 
  
(0.097) 
 
(0.085) 
 
(0.103) 
 Legal Enforce of Contracts b 0.570*** 98.4% 0.500*** 94.7% 0.467*** 89.3% 
  
(0.148) 
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.110) 
 
 
s 0.265*** 
 
0.309*** 
 
0.376*** 
 
  
(0.097) 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.069) 
 ln Market Size t-1 
 
1.963* 
 
2.688*** 
 
2.148*** 
 
  
(1.018) 
 
(0.748) 
 
(0.563) 
 Distance 
 
-0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 ln Market Potential t-1 
 
1.247 
 
1.080 
 
-0.588 
 
  
(0.977) 
 
(0.885) 
 
(0.680) 
 ln Education Level 
 
0.536 
 
1.184** 
 
0.708* 
 
  
(0.552) 
 
(0.478) 
 
(0.392) 
 ln Average Wage 
 
-1.490* 
 
-1.997*** 
 
-1.662*** 
 
  
(0.887) 
 
(0.729) 
 
(0.576) 
 Urban Agglomeration 
 
0.146** 
 
0.0754* 
 
0.098*** 
 
  
(0.060) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.031) 
 National Ownership 
 
0.004*** 
 
0.006*** 
 
0.006*** 
 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 Observations 
 
148,783 
 
165,724 
 
251,276 
 N of Cases 
 
6,888 
 
7,709 
 
11,745 
 Geographic contiguity  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Cultural dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 National dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 log likelihood   -17030   -18974   -29437   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1: Probability Density Functions for economic institutions exhibiting significant standard deviation 
in Table 3 
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Table 4 
 
MXL estimation of EU-15 MNEs location behavior by sector 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
Manufacturing Services 
High-Medium Tech. Medium-Low Tech. Knowledge-intensive  Less-knowledge-int. 
Dep. Var.: Location Choice θ Value % > 0 Value % > 0 Value % > 0 Value % > 0 
                    
Labor Market Regulation b -0.030  0.149*  0.002  -0.246**  
  (0.128)  (0.083)  (0.112)  (0.123)  
 s -0.105  0.005  0.013  0.206  
  (0.688)  (0.020)  (0.026)  (0.244)  
Business Regulation b 0.232 62.9% 0.572*** 87.1% 0.383**  0.406***  
  (0.160)  (0.106)  (0.157)  (0.152)  
 s 0.707***  0.507***  0.310  -0.014  
  (0.265)  (0.145)  (0.405)  (0.020)  
Government Expenditure b -0.013  0.043 99.9% 0.022  0.086**  
  (0.040)  (0.026)  (0.034)  (0.039)  
 s -0.016  0.002*  0.008  -0.000  
  (0.026)  (0.001)  (0.011)  (0.001)  
Protection of Prop. Rights b -0.189** 33.0% 0.086  -0.011 49.2% 0.046 55.6% 
  (0.093)  (0.069)  (0.099)  (0.105)  
 s 0.423*  -0.019  0.528***  0.333*  
  (0.217)  (0.019)  (0.113)  (0.178)  
Legal Enforc. of Contracts b 0.539 72.6% 0.740***  0.725**  0.095  
  (0.381)  (0.239)  (0.325)  (0.318)  
 s 0.894**  0.229  0.235  -0.004  
  (0.389)  (0.221)  (0.234)  (0.025)  
ln Market Size t-1 
 
-0.648 
 
4.576*** 
 
0.910 
 
0.450 
 
  
(2.518) 
 
(1.242) 
 
(1.742) 
 
(1.814) 
 Distance 
 
-0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 ln Market Potential t-1 
 
2.338 
 
0.720 
 
3.135 
 
0.717 
 
  
(2.752) 
 
(1.593) 
 
(1.922) 
 
(2.377) 
 ln Education Level 
 
-1.262 
 
0.286 
 
2.844** 
 
0.101 
 
  
(1.400) 
 
(0.830) 
 
(1.286) 
 
(1.367) 
 ln Average Wage 
 
0.593 
 
-3.821*** 
 
-0.234 
 
-0.905 
 
  
(2.172) 
 
(1.289) 
 
(1.799) 
 
(1.764) 
 Urban Agglomeration 
 
0.432*** 
 
0.105 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.021 
 
  
(0.142) 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.107) 
 National Ownership 
 
0.003*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
0.003*** 
 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
          Observations 
 
31,039 
 
56,795 
 
28,065 
 
27,357 
 Geographic contiguity 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Cultural dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 National dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 log likelihood  -3497   -6394   -3230   -3039   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 
 
MXL estimation of EU-15 MNEs location behavior by business function 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
HQ & Inno SSL Production 
Dep. Var.: Location Choice θ Value % > 0 Value % > 0 Value % > 0 
                
Labor Market Regulation b -0.003 
 
0.069 58.7% -0.078 
 
  
(0.138) 
 
(0.081) 
 
(0.077) 
 
 
s 0.011 
 
0.312* 
 
0.037 
 
  
(0.008) 
 
(0.185) 
 
(0.089) 
 Business Regulation b 0.328* 
 
0.527*** 83.4% 0.443*** 
 
  
(0.190) 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.088) 
 
 
s 0.512 
 
0.541*** 
 
0.265 
 
  
(0.369) 
 
(0.157) 
 
(0.239) 
 Government Expenditure b -0.029 
 
0.015 
 
0.083*** 
 
  
(0.041) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.024) 
 
 
s -0.002 
 
0.001 
 
-0.006 
 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.005) 
 Protection of Prop. Rights b -0.015 48.8% 0.071 
 
-0.070 
 
  
(0.118) 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.064) 
 
 
s 0.550*** 
 
-0.097 
 
0.193 
 
  
(0.138) 
 
(0.249) 
 
(0.159) 
 Legal Enforce of Contracts b -0.027 
 
0.544** 92.1% 0.764*** 
 
  
(0.397) 
 
(0.221) 
 
(0.207) 
 
 
s -0.271 
 
0.386** 
 
0.203 
 
  
(0.231) 
 
(0.157) 
 
(0.155) 
 ln Market Size t-1 
 
0.816 
 
4.108*** 
 
2.505** 
 
  
(2.070) 
 
(1.234) 
 
(1.094) 
 Distance 
 
-0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 ln Market Potential t-1 
 
0.794 
 
1.960 
 
-1.596 
 
  
(2.199) 
 
(1.522) 
 
(1.433) 
 ln Education Level 
 
1.849 
 
1.839** 
 
-1.458* 
 
  
(1.559) 
 
(0.767) 
 
(0.880) 
 ln Average Wage 
 
0.953 
 
-2.382* 
 
-2.790** 
 
  
(2.117) 
 
(1.219) 
 
(1.153) 
 Urban Agglomeration 
 
0.037 
 
0.099 
 
0.116* 
 
  
(0.106) 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.063) 
 National Ownership 
 
0.003*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
        Observations 
 
19,994 
 
64,381 
 
64,408 
 Geographic contiguity 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Cultural dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 National dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 log likelihood   -2293   -7372   -7204   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 
Summary Table of the Results on MNEs heterogeneous preferences for Economic Institutions 
 
All MNES 
Sectoral Heterogeneity 
Functional Heterogeneity 
Manufacturing Services 
High-
Medium 
tech 
Medium-
low tech 
Knowledge 
Intensive 
Less 
Knowledge 
Intensive 
HQ & Inno SSL Production 
Regulatory settings 
Labour Market 
Regulation NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Business 
Regulation 
+*** 
s*** (84%) 
 
s*** (63%) 
+*** +** +*** NO 
+*** 
s*** (83%) 
+*** 
 
Legal Framework 
Property Rights 
 
s*** (50%) 
-** 
s* (33%) 
NO 
 
s***(49%) 
NO 
 
s*** (49%) 
NO NO 
Enforcement of 
Contracts 
+*** 
s***(98%) 
 
s**(73%) 
+*** +** NO NO 
+** 
s**(92%) 
+*** 
Weight of the Government 
Share of Public 
Spending +** NO NO NO NO NO NO +*** 
+/- denotes the sign of the estimated b coefficients in tables 3,4 and 5. Asterisks denote significance as in original tables. Percentages 
reported in parentheses are %>0 in the preferences distribution. ‘NO’ stands for ‘No significance’ 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A.1 
Variable definitions and sources   
Variable Description  Source 
 
Dependent   
Location Choice Dummy indicating location choices among 23 destination 
countries 
FDi Markets 
 
Independent   
Economic Institutions 
Labor Market 
Regulation 
Index (0-10) indicating the flexibility of labor market in 
location j. 
Fraser 
Institute 
Business Regulation Index (0-10) indicating the administrative and bureaucratic 
burdens for business in location j. 
Fraser 
Institute 
Protection or 
Property Rights 
Index (0-10) indicating the extent to which government 
protects property rights in location j. 
Fraser 
Institute 
Legal Enforcement 
of Contracts  
Index (0-10) indicating the extent to which contracts are 
enforced by courts in location j. 
Fraser 
Institute 
Government 
expenditure 
Percentage of general government final consumption 
expenditure on GDP in location j. 
WDI 
Demand 
Ln Market Sizet-1 Log of GDP of destination j at time t-1. WDI 
Ln Market Potentialt-
1 
Log of the sum of distance-weighted GDP of all countries c 
within 1,000km from location j at time t-1, i for each c≠j. 
WDI / CEPII 
Trade Costs 
Geogr. Distance Physical distance measured in km. CEPII 
Geogr. Contiguity Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin r and destination j 
are contiguous. 
CEPII 
Labor Market 
Ln Education Level Log of the ratio between secondary school age population 
and total population in location j. 
UNESCO 
Ln Average Wage Log of per capita GDP in location j. WDI 
Agglomeration 
Urban 
Agglomeration 
Percentage of urban population on total population. WDI 
National Ownership Stock of investment in location j from the same country of 
origin r of firm i. 
FDi Markets 
Culture 
Official Language Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin r and location j share 
an official common language. 
CEPII 
Unofficial Language Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin r and location j share 
an unofficial common language. 
CEPII 
Common Colonizer 
after 1945 
Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin r and location j had a 
common colonizer after 1945. 
CEPII 
Colonial Link after 
1945 
Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin r and location j had a 
colonial tie after 1945. 
CEPII 
Same Country Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin r and location j have 
been part of the same country in the past. 
CEPII 
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Table A.2 
Classification of sectors 
Manufacturing 
High-Medium Technology Medium-Low Technology 
Aerospace Beverages 
Automotive components Building and Construction Materials 
Automotive OEM Consumer Products 
Biotechnology Food and Tobacco 
Business Machines and Equipment Metals 
Ceramic and Glass Minerals 
Chemicals Non-Automotive Transport OEM 
Consumer Electronics Paper, Printing and Packaging 
Electronic Components Plastics 
Engines and Turbines Rubber 
Industrial Machinery, Equipment and Tools Textiles 
Medical Devices Wood Products 
Pharmaceuticals 
 Semiconductors 
 
Services 
Knowledge-Intensive Less Knowledge-Intensive  
Business Services Hotels and Tourism 
Communications Leisure and Entertainment 
Financial Services Real Estate 
Healthcare Transportation 
Software and IT Services Warehousing and Storage 
Space and Defense 
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Table A.3 
Classification of business functions 
Headquarters and innovative activities 
Business Services 
Headquarters 
Design, Development and Testing 
Education and Training 
Research and Development 
 
Services, Sales and Logistics 
Customer Contact Centre 
Logistic, Distribution and Transportation 
Maintenance and Servicing 
Recycling 
Retail 
Sales, Marketing and Support 
Shared Services Centre 
Technical Support Centre 
 
Production 
Construction 
Electricity 
Extraction  
ICT and Internet Infrastructure 
Manufacturing 
 
 
 
